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THE *D--b* POLITICKS EXAMIN'D: OR, THE DANGER OF A Defenſive War TO THE CONFEDERATES.

IN

Reflections on the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Letter to the S——s General of the United Provinces, as well as on thoſe of Monſ. *D'Auverquerque* and D——s of the S----s, on the Subject of not Attacking the *French*. Alſo ſome Remarks on a Letter from *Altea*, inſerted in the *Poſt-Man*, *Sept.* 1.

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THE D——————— Politicks EXAMIN'D: OR, THE DANGER OF A Defenſive War TO THE CONFEDERATES.

I HAD long before this Publiſh'd my Thoughts on this Subject, had I not been extreamly Senſible that the Task I have undertaken was very Difficult to Perform, both in Regard of the Perſons I muſt Write of, and thoſe I muſt Write to. The firſt are Men of the foremoſt Fi-

gure in the World, the latter Men govern'd by divided Intereſts and Parties, with ſo implicit a Faith that they Conſult not their Reaſon in eitheir Actions, Opinions, or Cenſures; and it is ſufficient to loſe the beſt Cauſe in the World, and the beſt defended too, if it, in any Part, claſh with their Inclinations or Party.

Notwithſtanding this I ſhall not in the firſt Place be Aw'd by the Grandeur of any Perſon or Perſons from that Liberty the Laws of my Country have given me, but ſhall Offer the Dictates of my Reaſon, in Defence of the Honour, and Reputation of that Country which gave me Birth, and its greateſt Glory, the Duke of *Marlborough*, againſt thoſe, who either by Ignorance, Malice, Envy, Revenge, Fear, or miſtaken Intereſt, have endeavour'd to ſtop the Progreſs of his Victories, and delay, by that, his Settling the Liberty, and Peace of *Europe* on a ſure, and laſting Foundation. Nor ſhall I have any Regard to the Reſentment of any Party whatever, ſo far, as to Curb the Freedom of my Diſcourſe, as far, as the Limits of Reaſon and Juſtice will permit.

I muſt yet Premiſe one thing, that I would not Incur the Imputation of being an Enemy to the *Dutch*, as Confederate with us for the Common Liberty of *Europe* againſt the Univerſal Invader and Oppreſſor of Mankind, the *French* King. As they are ſo, I am of Opinion, that Sir *Walter Rawleigh's* Maxim will yet hold True, that was, *That he ſhould always Meaſure any Man's Love to* **England** *by his Love to* **Holland**, for, as they were then, they are ſtill our Barrier on the

the Continent, then, againſt the over-grown Power of *Spain*, now againſt the far greater Power of *France*. I will yet go farther, and allow that Hiſtory has not given any Example of ſo great and formidable a State riſing in ſo ſhort a Time, from ſuch ſmall and doubtful Beginnings againſt ſo great a Power, as the *Spaniſh* Monarchy then had. *Rome* ſtruggled hard among Dominions of very little larger Extent than her own for above Three Hundred Years, all that while ſcarce ſtretching her Arms with all her Virtue and Valour above Ten Miles round their City. The *Athenian* Common-wealth never made any great Figure of any continuance beyond its Ancient and Native Bounds. And *Venice* roſe by ſtoln Degrees, unminded by, if not unknown to the prevailing Power of the *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Lombards*, *Goths*, &c. And after a Thouſand Years Continuance comes infinitely ſhort of the Common-wealth of *Holland*, both in Power and Wealth; for while the States Maintain a Hundred Thouſand Men againſt *France*, beſides 60 or 70 Sail of Men of War, the *Venetian* Tamely and Impotently ſuffers his Country to be harraſs'd and inſulted by the *Gallick* Forces.

All this I have thought my ſelf oblig'd in Juſtice to premiſe, leſt any one ſhould think me blindly Malicious againſt a Nation, who have formerly obtain'd a great deal of Glory, and are at preſent a formidable Part of our Common Defence; as long as they are Sincere in the League, and underſtand their own Intereſt, which is beyond Controverſie firmly and indiſputably United to the reſt of the Confederacy. But when they

give apparent Inſtances of Want either of Zeal, Courage, or Conduct, (to give it no worſe a Name) when they ſhall Risk the Liberties of *Europe*, which they have been all this while contending for, meerly by deputing Men with their Power, who either out of their own Native Fear, or Ignorance, influenced by the Private Malice, Envy or Reſentment of Under Officers, ſhall loſe Opportunities which can ſcarce ever be recover'd, or by a Purſuit of a miſtaken Intereſt of their own, ſhall order their De------s to have no Regard to the Common Cauſe, with which, in Reality, even this miſtaken Intereſt falls, it is the Duty of every True *Engliſhman* to Expoſe and Reſent the Injury done to him in the Perſon of our Heroick General.

After the many Reflections, and painted Lampoons of that Nation on a certain *German* Prince for his Inactivity againſt the Publick Enemy, tho' perhaps that very Inactivity was the Effect of the ill Conduct of the late Miniſtry of *Vienna*, which brought Prince *Eugene* of *Savoy* out of *Italy*, after he had made a Stand with a Handful of Brave Fellows unprovided againſt the *French* and *Spaniſh* Power, where as if that Court had ſupply'd him, as they ought to have done, with Men, Money, Ammunition, *&c.* he certainly before this had drove the Enemy out of *Italy*, ſecur'd *Savoy*, and enter'd *Languidoc*, to the Relief of the *Cevennois*, and ſoon concluded the War: After, I ſay, that the *D*—— Nation had thus reflected on Prince *Lewis*, without conſidering whether it were his own Fault, or not, for them to take a Nap, juſt when they

they had it in their Power to be Awake to the Purpoſe, for ever to have broke the *French* Force on their Side, and enlarg'd their Barriers, to give it all up, Bar the Dice, and if not, throw up the Cards, at leaſt play the Game booty, is a Conduct that ſurprizes all the World, and provokes all true *Engliſhmen* with a juſt Indignation at their Honeſty or Politicks. It may perhaps be urg'd, that thoſe Pictures made of Pr. *L.* were not by the St—s, but the People; and that by Conſequence the St—s are not to be rul'd by them, but they by the St—s. It is certain that thoſe Cutts, which came from *Holland* hither were the Product of ſome private Head and Hand, and not of the St—s; but that on the other Side it muſt be remembred, that they were produc'd by the general Diſcourſe, and Bent of the People of that Country to Action, as viſibly neceſſary to our Succeſs and Safety; and ſince the St—s did not puniſh the Engraver, or Painter, it was a tacit Allowance of the Satyr, and will ſtand good againſt them, when we find them under none of thoſe Difficulties, with which Pr. *L.* labour'd, acting the ſame Part, and playing a Dilatory Game, where the Liberty of *Europe* is the Stake, which cannot be ſecur'd but by Reſolution and Boldneſs; by Fighting, and not by Dodging, Marching and Countermarching, *&c.* And this has made me enquire into the Cauſe of this Miſmanagement, and to conſider the Natural Event of it.

Before I come to examine the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Letter, and thoſe of the *Deputies* and M. *Averquerque*'s, I ſhall beg Leave to conſider the very ſending any D——s at all to overlook and over-

over-awe the Generals of their Armies. It is a Practice, which none of the Wiſe States of Antiquity ever made uſe of, till the *Grecian* Commonwealths, when they had thought any Man by the Experience of his Valour and Conduct fit to be General of their Armies, never took either Philoſophers from their Gardens, Porches, or Schools, or Tradeſmen from their Shops, to command over them, and to order or forbid them venturing Battle, when the Generaliſſimo thought fit to engage: And this from the very Nature of the Thing, for they very well judg'd, that it was improbable, that Men, whoſe Profeſſion had bent their Minds, and emp'oy'd all their Thoughts, either in Contemplation, and fine Amuſements about the Secret and Hidden Operations of Nature, or in the Low and Mechanick Performances of the Hands, or in Buying and Selling, and the little Tricks of little Chapmen, ſhou'd know when to fight an Enemy, or when to forbear, better than a General who had ſpent his Life in the Art and Practice of War, who had gain'd too large a Share of Glory to throw it away on any raſh or fooliſh Attempt, which cou'd promiſe nothing but Diſgrace, and the Deſtruction of thoſe Lawrels he had gained. They very well knew, that there is, generally ſpeaking, an Habitual, or at leaſt a Native Fear in Men of a Sedentary or Merchantile Life, which muſt magnifie the Danger to them; nay, make that ſeem an inſurmountable Difficulty, which in Reality is nothing to Men fluſh'd with Victory, and of a Native Bravery, under unqueſtionable Diſcipline and Conduct. What Doubts, what Fears, what Dangers would they have

have rais'd before the Battle of *Marathon* againſt *Miltiades* venturing with ſo ſmall a Force, as 11000 Men, which he commanded, againſt an Army of 600000 *Perſians*, and that within Ten Miles of *Athens*; where if he had loſt the Battle, his whole Country, and the Glorious City of *Athens* it ſelf, muſt have been an immediate Prey to the Grand Monarch of *Perſia*, *Darius Hyſtaſpes*.

But before I make my Reflections, let us ſee how the Story is told by *Juſtin*; to come to which I am oblig'd for the Connection to go a little higher. '*Piſiſtratus*, an *Athenian* General, had u-'ſurp'd the *Tyranny* of *Athens*, and enjoy'd it 34 'Years, and then left it to his Son *Diocles*; he 'was Murthered by the Brother of a young Lady 'whom he had raviſh'd; he was ſucceeded by his 'Brother *Hippias*, who commands the Murtherer to 'be apprehended, and put to the Rack, to con-'feſs his Accomplices, but he confeſſes all the intimate 'Creatures and Friends of the Tyrant; and when 'they were executed upon his Accuſation, and the 'Priſoner ask'd if there were any more guilty? He 'reply'd, That none now remain'd, whoſe Death 'he deſired, but the Tyrant himſelf. The Example 'of ſo extraordinary a Virtue in this young Man 'rouz'd the *Athenians* to think of their Liberty, 'which in the end they effected by expelling *Hip-'pias* from the Throne which his Father had trea-'cherouſly uſurp'd. But *Hippias*, like all Tyrants, 'valuing his own Arbitrary Power and Dignity a-'bove the Good of his Country, retir'd into *Per-'ſia*, and there offers to conduct *Darius*, (fond as 'the preſent *French* King of Abdicated Tyrants, as

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'a Ground of after Pretenſions on his Neighbour's 'Eſtates and Rights) and his Army againſt his 'own Country. The *Athenians* having Intelli-'gence of the Approach of *Darius*, ſolicite Aſſi-'ſtance from their Allies at this time, the *Lace-'demonians*; but finding, that they by a Superſti-'tious Religion, wou'd delay their Succours for Four 'Days, muſtering Ten Thouſand Citizens, and 'and One Thouſand *Platean* Auxiliaries, march'd 'into the Plains of *Marathon*, in order to fight an 'Army of 600000 *Perſians*. *Miltiades* was the Ge-'neral of the *Athenian* Forces, and Author of this 'Advice, and Reſolution of not expecting the *La-'cedemonian* Succours, who was poſſeſs'd with ſo 'great an Aſſurance of Succeſs, that he was of O-'pinion, that Diſpatch would contribute more to 'his Safety, than the Allies, whom he expected. 'There was therefore in all the Soldiers an inex-'preſſible Alacrity, which made them run to the 'Onſet with ſuch Celerity and Vigour, that they 'prevented the firſt Arrows, which they ſhot, by their 'Swords on the Enemy. In ſhort, nor was their 'Boldneſs without a happy Event, the Battle was 'fought with ſo great a Diſparity, that you wou'd 'ſay, that Men fought on the *Greek* Side, but meer 'Cattle on the other. The *Perſians* being van-'quiſh'd, fly to their Ships, but of thoſe many pe-'riſh'd, and many were taken Priſoners.

This ſhort Hiſtory will plainly make appear the Abſurdity of making any D———s of leſs Qualifi-cations, than the General himſelf, who ſhall by their own Fears or Ignorance direct the General. Had theſe D———s been in the Army of *Miltiades*, the

the Fame of the Battle of *Marathon* had never reach'd our Age, and *Athens* had in Probability ſunk under ſo numerous a Force, led by one that knew both the Country and its Strength. They would have urg'd, that Four Days was not long to wait, that 11000 were no manner of Proportion to 600000; who tho' ſuppos'd inexpert and undiſciplin'd Troops, yet by their very Number muſt oppreſs ſuch a handful; but that yet it ought to be remembred, that thoſe Men who had conquer'd all *Aſia*, and more than once invaded *Europe*, were not to be contemn'd as not able to reſiſt ſuch a handful of Men as *Miltiades* commanded: That *Miltiades* ſhou'd conſider, that by the Addition of the *Lacedemonians* he might expect to be at leaſt as ſtrong again as he was at preſent, both by the Number of their Troops, and their known Courage and Diſcipline. That if he run the hazard of a Battle, with all the Army of the State of *Athens*, and that were beaten, as it could not in time at leaſt be recruited, he gave up his Country into the Hands of an Enemy, who if not to be vanquiſh'd, not to be provok'd to treat them worſe, than he otherwiſe might. Nay, they might perhaps urge, that the worſt they had to expect was the impoſing on them *Hippias*, whom they had baniſh'd, and that under him it wou'd be better, than to have their Country laid waſte by an enraged Enemy, who had no Bounds of his Paſſions but a Will, which was always guided by them.

Theſe, and many more Reaſons, Envy or Ignorance might urge againſt ſo noble and bold a Reſolution as *Miltiades* took, had his Power and

Command been curb'd by the Judgment of De—ties. Nor wou'd they have wanted ſome Under-Officers or Commanders, who either out of Envy to the Glory of *Miltiades*, or Diſguſt for being in a lower Poſt, than ſome other, who commanded him, or out of a Deſire of Protracting the War, or out of Complement to the D——s, by ſiding with their Inclinations, wou'd have given their Vote againſt the Engagement; and ſo not only the Honour of that Day, but the Liberty of *Athens* and *Greece* had been gone and loſt. Men leſs, than a *Miltiades* or *Marlborough* ſee not Things, as they really are; when Danger preſents it ſelf, and glares them in the Face, they ſwell and encreaſe; Mole-hills riſe to Mountains, and Ditches to impaſſible Rivers. Daſtards and routed Enemies appear formidable and invincible, and Raw, Beardleſs, Undiſciplin'd Boys look Terrible, and Veteran, and Victorious, and Irreſiſtible.

There is a Sedateneſs of Judgment in a Breaſt void of Fear; and when a General knows both his own and Enemies Troops, all little ſeeming Difficulties vaniſh juſtly, and are not minded. The Conduct and Bravery of the General, the Valour and Succeſs of the Soldiers, and their Native Temper, as is expreſs'd by *Juſtin* of the *Athenians* in this Battle of *Marathon*, are above half the Victory. And we find theſe had given an Omen that was not vain; for *Miltiades*, without the Help of his *Lacedemonian* Allies, beat the unweildy Army of the great King of *Perſia*, and kill'd 200000 on the Spot, and in the Purſuit.

Theſe were the Reaſons why the wiſer States of *Greece* left their Armies to ſuch, whom they had thought fit to make their Generals, without clogging their Valour and Conduct with the Ignorance and Fears of ſenſleſs D——s, who know nothing of the Matter.

The *Romans*, who ſubdu'd the World, by the Valour and Conduct of their Generals, left their Armies to their Command, without any D——s or Guardians to overlook them, as if they were under Age in the Diſcipline of War. Nor did this S—te herſelf riſe from its ſmall Beginnings, and make Head againſt all the Forces of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy by ſo fooliſh a Conduct. The Great Prince, who laid their Foundation, acted without this Clog, or they had never been what they are. For one Queſtion may be ask'd which they can never reſolve, either theſe D——s are Men conſummate in the Art of War, and better skili'd than their Generals, or they are not; if they are, how fooliſh is it not to make them Generals; if not, how much more fooliſh to ſet thoſe who are not perfect in the Matter, to over-rule thoſe who are? But not only this State in its Original, but I believe no Nation beſides under the Copes of Heaven ſent Pacific D——s of War, who underſtand nothing of the Matter, to be the Umpires and laſt Judges of the moſt important Tranſactions of the Field, as Battles, Sieges, *&c.* how is it poſſible but they muſt let ſlip thoſe Opportunities of Advantage which may never be recover'd, and either by their Fear, or the falſe Repreſentation of other Officers, who may either be ſecret Traitors, brib'd by the

Enemy, or Envious of their Superior Generals, diſguſted with their Station, as below their Merit or Due. Or if the Caſe be rightly ſtated, how ſhall thoſe decide the Matter between Two different Opinions of the higheſt Importance, who are not proper Judges of one Particular, on which the Council is divided? Can any thing but Ruin attend ſuch a Conduct in ſuch a Criſis, as this? To give the *French* breathing Time, to let them recover the Loſs of their old Troops, inur'd to Victory by many Years Succeſſes; to ſuffer thoſe who have been diſ-ſpirited by the former Loſs to gather new Spirit, by ſeeing the Enemy they were afraid of, without ſuffering any Diſgrace from him; by little Skirmiſhes with that Enemy, with the Majority on their Side; to uſe and familiarize them to thoſe, who conquer'd their Brethren or Predeceſſors, is to give the Enemy new Heart, and to diſ-ſpirit our Men, who will forget the Succeſs they have met with, and make them think that new and greater Difficulties daily ariſe, which are now inſuperable; that the *French*, like *Hydra*'s Heads, ſpring double for one cut off, and thoſe more ſtrong and terrible; that by little Rencounters, ill ſupported, our Courage may be tam'd as much, as the Nature of our Men will bear. If theſe ſhou'd be the Events, as they are vaſtly more likely to be, than our ill Succeſs on the Attack, in vain have we labour'd, in vain has even Heaven indulg'd a fooliſh Generation with ſuch Succeſs, as no Hiſtory ever parallell'd, if we throw away the Bleſſing, and are not yet convinc'd of its Favour and Protection; but fear the very Shadows of thoſe we have deſtroy'd, till we loſe the Advantage

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which Heaven had beſtow'd by a Folly as unparallell'd in Hiſtory, as the Victory.

Much more might be ſaid on this General Head againſt all manner of D------s to overawe the Generals, to whoſe Conduct and Experience it is much ſafer truſting, than to their *Folly*, *Ignorance*, or *Fear*. But the Brevity I deſign denies me that, and binds me to what only is Neceſſary to the clearing this Point, and vindicating the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Reſolution of Fighting the *French*; not like *Miltiades*, with a handful againſt a Nation, but with an Army fluſh'd with Victory, more Numerous, and better Troops, than that of the Enemy.

Having therefore premis'd this, I ſhall now proceed to his Grace the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Letter, as I find it in the **Poſt-Man** of *Tueſday, Aug.* 21. 1705. with this Remarkable Introduction, which was not expected from the Author of the *Poſtman*. Hague, Aug. 25. *The March of the Grand Army has not prov'd ſo Succeſsful as was expected. The Duke of* **Marlborough** *gives the following Account thereof in a Letter to the States General, which was Printed on* Saturday *Morning by Mr.* **Stephen Fovique**, *a Bookſeller of this Place, and not by Mr.* **Schetus**, *Printer to the States General.*

Before I proceed to his Grace's Letter I muſt Animadvert a little on this Paſſage, as a ſubtle Inſinuation that the Duke's Letter was forg'd, and ſo to Impoſe on the People, as if no Injury had been done the Duke and the Confederacy by the S---s, or at leaſt by their D------s, but at the ſame Time after the Duke's Letter he put in

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a forg'd Epiſtle of Mr. *D' Auverquerque's* as Authentick, or at leaſt without any Inuendo of its not being Printed by the States Printer; whereas the former is prov'd beyond Controverſie Authentick, and the latter evidently Spurious, as the *Poſt-Boy* very *fairly* and *rationally* ſuppoſes it on its Firſt Publication.

I am the more ſurpriz'd to find this in the *Poſt-Man*, becauſe he has ſettled his Reputation for Good Intelligence and Impartiality, and owes the Succeſs of his Paper to our Opinion of thoſe alone. I am unwilling to preſs a thing of this Nature, as far as it would go, on a Gentleman who has ſeem'd to have a Deference for the Good and Honour of a Country, which has been very Civil to him, and his Endeavour. But it looks very odd, that a Man who has all along ſeem'd ſo hearty in the *Engliſh* Intereſt, ſhould ſet up for a Sort of Advocate for the *D—h* here in *England*, by ſmothering, in a manner, the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Complaint of an Injury done the *Publick Cauſe*, and his Honour in Particular by the De----s, if not their *Principals*. I ſhou'd have paſs'd this in Silence, but that I find that many Gentlemen, who are no Enemies to the Author, very much Reſent this Conduct, as a little reflecting on his Grace the Duke of *Marlborough*, as if the very penning the Letter had not been Evidence enough of its being *Genuine*, as that of Mr. *D' Auverquerque* is of being *Spurious*. Nothing has made me ſo Particular in this more than his Publiſhing a Letter from *Altea* in *Tueſday's Poſt-Man*, which is a Notorious Libel on the Queen

Queen and the Miniſtry, as I ſhall ſhew when I come to it. But to proceed to the Duke's Letter.

High and Mighty Lords,

'ACcording to what I had the Honour to Write 'to Your High and Mightineſſes the 13th In- 'ſtant, the Army march'd on *Saturday* laſt, we en- 'camp'd that Day at *Corbais* and St. *Martin*, and 'the next Day at *Genap*. *Monday* we came to *Fi- 'chermont*, and Yeſterday before break of Day we 'were in Motion, and after having paſt ſeveral 'Defiles, came into the Plain, finding the Enemy 'encamp'd, as we expected, between *Over-Iſche*, 'and *Neer Iſche*, with the little *Rivulet* of *Iſche* 'before them. About Noon the Army was drawn 'up in *Batalia*; and having with Mr. D' Auver- 'querque *view'd all* Four *Poſts I deſign'd to At- 'tack, I already flatter'd my ſelf* (conſidering the 'Goodneſs and Superiority of our Troops) 'to have ſudden Opportunity of Congratulating Your 'High and Mightineſſes upon a Glorious Victory. 'But when there was *nothing remaining* but to At- 'tack, it was not *thought fit* to do it. I am Con- 'fident that the Deputies of Your High and Migh- 'tineſſes will Acquaint you with the *Reaſons* al- 'ledg'd to them on *either ſide*, and that they will 'do that Juſtice to Monſieur D' *Auverquerque*, that *he* 'was of the *ſame Opinion* with *me*, that the Op- 'portunity was too fair to be let ſlip. But 'however, I have ſubmitted, though with a *great 'deal of* Regret. I ſhall ſpeak this Day to the 'Deputies and Monſieur D' *Auverquerque*, that they

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'may give Neceſſary Orders to the Attack of *Lewe*,
'and to continue the Demoliſhing the Lines.

I am, &c.

From the Camp at *Baſſe Wavre*, *Aug.* 19. 1705.

'P. S. **My Heart is ſo full, that I can-
'not forbear Repreſenting on this Occaſion
'to Your High and Mightineſſes, that I have
'much leſs Authority here, than when I
'had the Honour to Command Your Troops
'laſt Year in** Germany.

Though every Line of this Letter expreſs the Great Man who Wrote it, and highly Merits a Remark, yet for Brevity I ſhall only touch thoſe Places which loudly D.mand our Conſiderations, General and Particular.

We ſhou'd offer to the S—s or their D——s to Reflect where their State, and where all *Europe* had been long ſince, had not the Money and Arms of *England* kept the great Devourer from their Door, who, like the *Sphinx* at *Thebes*, o'er-look'd their Walls, and Beſieged them round in their own Country. I omit to ſpeak of the Blood and Treaſure expended by *England* in the Common Cauſe, moſt of which fell into the Hands of the Subjects of the States without ever returning to *England*, whoſe Danger was Remote, if at all Deſperate, though the reſt of *Europe* had ſunk beneath the *Gallic* Yoke, broke by the *Engliſh* Arms and Money. I confine my ſelf to the Pre-

Preſent War, let the S——s look back to the Deplorable Memorial ſent over to his Late and her Preſent Majeſty, and then Anſwer me, if they wou'd not have agreed, that no *S—p-b—r*, *C—ſe-m—r*, or *Herr—g-ſ—r*, ſhould be put over the Conduct of our Generals, and Rule them like School-boys, or Children, giving them a Titular, Specious, Name of Generals, without any thing of the Power? Wou'd they not have yielded to any Conſiderations to engage us in a Reſcue of them from the very Jaws of the Lion? Perhaps I might urge yet a farther Point, which has not been fully deſtroy'd by the Patrons of our ingaging in the War. Let the S—s conſider, whether or no it was not in the Power of the *Engliſh* to have remained Neuters, or been only Secondarily concern'd in this War? That is, whether we cou'd not have remain'd in Peace with *France*, and only Lett our Forces, or Lent our Money to the *D-—h* to Fight their Battles, or thoſe of the Common Cauſe, without loſing the Advantage of a Free Commerce, which wou'd have ſav'd *England* Millions of Money, beſides engroſſing all the *Spaniſh* Trade, which muſt have enrich'd our Country, and enabled us to have defended our ſelves from all the World? I would have them likewiſe to conſider whether they, in that Deplorable Condition, wou'd not have willingly allow'd us only to have carry'd on our War by Sea, as being an Iſland, whoſe Proper Force is Natural in Maritime Expeditions. From this what Advantages muſt have riſen to *England*, when all our Money had been employ'd in encreaſing and ſtrengthning

our own Defence, our Navy, and employing our Men in our Fights at Sea, not at Land, which is Foreign to our Affairs, or our Safety. This had made the Seas, and by Conſequence Trade our own, and all that Money, that has been exported, only Circulate in our own Dominions, which muſt have made the whole Nation Happy and Rich? Or if we yet had agreed to ſend Land Forces over to ſecure the S——s Country, their High and Mightineſſes wou'd not, in that Deſperate Condition, have diſputed accepting the Pay of thoſe very Soldiers (who fought moſt immediately in their Defence, and call'd in by them) in Commodities of the Product and Manufacture of our People, not in Bullion, or coin'd Money, which muſt in Time Exhauſt our Nation, and Inrich theirs, while the Source of our Bullion, the *Spaniſh* Trade, is ſhut up.

But if inſtead of all theſe Advantages, which we might have reap'd by purſuing our immediate and diſtinct Intereſt at the low Ebb of their Affairs, we made our ſelves Principals in the War, in which we might only have been Seconds, and generouſly embark'd our ſelves in the ſame Bottom, with the Diſadvantages of tranſmitting not only our Men, but our Money in Specie for theirs, and the Common Cauſe, let them conſider, if ſo Honourable and Diſintereſſed a Procedure deſerv'd ſo Brutal a Return, after we had deliver'd them from their impending Ruin, to have not only our General inſulted, and controul'd by their *Ch—ſe m—s* and *S—p-b—s*, but the Common Cauſe endamag'd, and the Expence we enter'd into for their Sakes, pro-

long'd

long'd by an Unneceſſary Protraction of the War, meerly to continue the Private Advantages they receiv'd from our Remittances, *&c.* They ſhould likewiſe conſider whether the *Engliſh* Nation, and their Repreſentatives in *Parliament*, wou'd Tamely ſwallow ſo Groſs an Affront? Whether a Prince ſo Illuſtrious for his Valour and Conduct, who by that, and the unparallell'd Bravery of his Forces, gave *France* the greateſt Blow it ever felt in the full Courſe of its Victories, and purſuit of that Univerſal Monarchy, it had by the Folly and Weakneſs of its Oppoſers made ſo near an Approach to, that nothing but ſuch Peculiar Agents of Providence, as my Lord Duke of *Marlborough* and his Troops, cou'd have diſappointed.

When by the Treachery, Supinity, or Folly of the *Germans*, not one of the Meaſures agreed on were purſu'd to render the Second March to the *Moſelle* of the Duke, of as great, or far greater Conſequence to the Confederacy, than this Firſt to the *Danube*, but every thing delay'd that ſhou'd have enabl'd him to have made the Mareſchal *de Villars* run the ſame Fate, with that of the Mareſchal *de Tallard*, and ſo almoſt at one Blow have put an End to the War by penetrating into the Heart of *France*, by Ways where the Difficulties and Obſtructions were leaſt. When the S——s were left to make Head againſt the *French* and *Bavarians* in the *Low-Countries*, by Way of Diverſion, they were not able even to Defend their Ground, *Huy* was Taken, *Liege* Surrender'd, Mr. *Auverquerque* ſhut up in his Camp; then they apply'd again to the Duke, and the *Engliſh*

liſh Forces to come back and deliver them from an Enemy no other cou'd Cope with, and which they themſelves were not able to Reſiſt. The Diſappointments were magnify'd, the Duke's Return preſs'd, whoſe firſt Motion towards the *Maes* put a ſtop to the Progreſs of the *French* Arms, ſtruck a Terror into their Soldiers, and Generals, and made them with a Precipitate Retreat leave all their imagin'd Conqueſts to Retire for Safety within their Lines, which they ſtretch'd and fortify'd with all their Diligence and Application; and that Fear which had poſſeſs'd the *D—h*, paſs'd over to their Enemies by the Preſence of the Forces, of their Allies, and their General, who had given Proofs, that he was none of thoſe dreaming Generals, who had by the Lazineſs of their Conduct made the *French* grow to that Power, they are now, or lately were Maſters of, and which only the Valour and Conduct of *England*, and her General, were fated to Deſtroy. They knew the Duke was for bringing the War, that harraſs'd all *Europe* for the Benefit of a Few, and the Ambitious Ends of *One*, and the Mercenary Deſigns of ſome Others, had been ſo long protracted, to an End. And ſeeing this, they knew nothing common cou'd Defend them from his Aſſaults, but by Indefatigable Pains, and Induſtry of their Soldiers and Subjects, ſurrounded thoſe Countries they had ſurreptitiouſly obtain'd by Mounds and Ditches almoſt Inacceſſible, placing their Safety more in thoſe, than in their Armies, as numerous, as they were.

Cou'd any of the Rational Race of Mankind after this imagine that the St—s ſhould impoſe ſo forbid a Condition on this Brave General, and his Noble Soldiers, as to be at the Beck and Direction of a *Ch---ſe-m---r* and *S---p-b--r?* That all his Noble Deſigns (of which he by the Force of his own Genius, and Great Soul, had fram'd ſo many amazing and admirably concerted, for the Ruin of the Common Enemy, if they had been executed in all their Parts, with a quarter of the Honour and Bravery, they were form'd with Judgment) that all his Noble Deſigns, I ſay, ſhou'd be meaſur'd, ſcann'd, and weigh'd by the little narrow Souls of ſuch Mechanicks, is what cou'd never have enter'd into the Heart of any Man of common Senſe to imagine.

What Pains did the Duke take? What Remonſtrances did he make to prevail with the St—s, to ſuffer him to attempt the breaking of theſe Lines? And is it not unaccountable that theſe *D——h* Politicians ſhou'd at laſt agree to ſuffer him to venture on ſo deſperate an Attack, (to ſpeak in their Language) and yet after he had ſucceeded in that, and had come up with the Enemy under all their Fears of flying before the Conquerors, encompaſs'd with far leſs fortified Entrenchments, than the Lines, that they ſhou'd deny the Onſet, when all the Places were viewed, and thought very practicable, by not only the *Engliſh*, but by much the beſt of the *D---—h* Generals? Will After-Ages believe this? Or can we yet our ſelves think it otherwiſe, than a ſick Man's Dream, compounded of Contradictions?

But

But that we may not be thought to pronounce too general a Sentence on their H—— and M——s's Conduct, which perhaps was in nothing faulty but in ſending any D——s at all, let us run over the Account given of the Matter by his Grace in his Letter.

The firſt Particular that requires a Remark is where his Grace tells the St—s—*Yeſterday, before Break of Day, we were in Motion, and after having paſt ſeveral* **Defiles,** *came into the Plain,—finding the Enemy encamp'd* **as we expected,** *between* **Over-Iſche** *and* **Neer-Iſche,** *with the* **little Rivulet Iſche** *before them.*——From this I obſerve that this March was not Raſhly, and without Conſideration, and Information, undertaken; nay, as appears from the Account of the D——s themſelves by the Conſent and Order of the St—s; not Raſhly, I ſay, nor without Information, becauſe his Grace plainly tells them, that they found the Enemy where they *expected* them, and encamped as they *expected* them, between the *Over-Iſche* and *Neer-Iſche*, with only a *little* Rivulet betwixt them; not ſuch Fortifications, as their Lines, which had been Two Years making, with ſuch Mounds, and ſuch Ditches, of a Breadth much larger, than this *little Rivulet.* I might add ſomething more to this Conſideration, but that I reſerve it to my Reflections on the Letter of the D——s, which agrees with his Grace in this Point as to the Marches. But to proceed—About Noon (ſays his Grace) the Army was drawn up in Battalia —*And having with Mr.* **Averquerque** *view'd all* **four** *Poſts, which I deſign'd to attack.* This ſhews the Deliberation of his Grace in this Affair; he

he left not the viewing the Poſts to any Inferiour Officer, General or other, but went himſelf to be juſtly and perfectly inform'd by his own Eyes, and his own Judgment, of the Strength and Weakneſs of the Paſſes he was to force, to come at and deſtroy his Enemy. But out of an abounding Modeſty, and cauſleſs Diffidence of acting entirely on his own Judgment, tho' the beſt in the World, he choſe Monſ. *D'Averquerque* Generaliſſimo of the *D——h* Forces to go with him, that he might have his Opinion, and hear his Reaſons, either for or againſt what he otherwiſe might deſign. Monſ. *D'Averquerque* has the Reputation not only of one of the fineſt Gentlemen that *Holland* has produc'd of theſe latter Times, and by that Means gain'd the Hearts of all the *Engliſh* when he was here in King *WILLIAM*'s Reign, but is eſteem'd the beſt General of that Nation; a Man of as much Caution as is poſſibly conſiſtent with ſo much Valour, or perhaps more than he wou'd really exerciſe in any Service but that of the *D——h*, as being indeed more, than is abſolutely neceſſary for a Victorious General, who muſt not always be on the Defence, but muſt, if he wou'd get Fame, or do his Country any valuable Service, try to Attack, as well, as to Defend. Yet this Wary, Cautious, Brave General, after he had viewed the Paſſes with my Lord Duke, was of Opinion, **That the Opportunity was too fair to be let ſlip**; and his Grace, after viewing the ſame Paſſes, tells the St—s that —— *He flatter'd himſelf (conſidering the* **Goodneſs** *and* **Superiority** *of our Troops) to have ſuddain Opportunity of Congratulating their High and Mighti-*

neſſes

neſſes upon a Glorious Victory.——Every Word of this will require a large and aggravating Comment, if I ſhould follow the Impulſe of a Zealot for the Good of my Country, and the Liberty of *Europe*. But I ſhall curb the Impatience of my Heart, and ſpeak with all the Moderation I can. We find that Monſ. *Auverquerque*, as cautious as he is, and the Duke, whoſe Temper was admirably expreſs'd by our late King *WILLIAM*, of Glorious Memory, when he gave him the Character of being a Man of a Cool Head and a Heart, agreed that the *Opportunity was too fair to be let ſlip*——Opportunity too fair for what? For Danger, Hazard, and the Ruin of the *D*—— and *E*—— Armies. No, but of Victory, of a Glorious Victory, aſſured by the *Goodneſs* and *Superiority* of our Troops. All the Aſſurance that Mortal Man cou'd have of Succeſs, and that ſo fair and promiſing, that nothing but Stupidity or Treachery wou'd have let ſlip. What cou'd Great Generals do more? They view'd the Paſſes, the moſt difficult Paſſes, by which they were to force the Enemy's Camp themſelves, and cou'd not by their own Eyes diſcover any thing ſo unſurmountable, or ſo hazardous in them, which the *Goodneſs* and *Superiority* of our Troops cou'd not eaſily overcome. Was here any thing of the Battle of *Marathon* mention'd before? Was the Enemy Forty to One? Yet unoppos'd? Or not baffled by the very Men, who were going to attack them? On the contrary, were they not the ſame, who cou'd not defend themſelves within the Retrenchments of ſtrong Lines? Who fled before them, and Multitudes of young raw Fellows, who made not the leaſt

leaſt Stand on our forcing the Lines, or at all ſupported the *Bavarians*, who fell by our Swords for their ſingle Bravery? If *Miltiades* by his own Fire animated his Men, with ſuch Courage as to deſtroy with 11000 *Athenians* 600000 *Perſians*, cou'd we ſuppoſe, that Men ſo Brave, as ours, all eager to fight, led on by a General Fortunate, as Brave, Superior in *Number* and *Force* to the Enemy, cou'd want Succeſs, when the beſt of Cauſes gave them Bleſſing, and the beſt of Generals Life and Vigour? No, no, it is too *Shameful* and *Scandalous* an Event to dwell on; and none but a Man ſo entirely Maſter of his Paſſions, and ever have forborn a Reſentment, which the Injuries of ſo great a Part of Mankind call'd for, when his Victorious Arm liſted on high, was ſtopp'd by his falſe Friends from cutting off the laſt of the *Hydra*'s Heads, which lay groveling at his Feet, and trembling, expected the Fatal Blow. That *D——h S-- p-b--rs* and *Ch--ſe-m---r* ſhould make the Enemy ſecure, than all their Entrenchments or *Rivulet* of *Iſche*, that ſtruck ſuch a Panick Terror into the little Souls of the D——s, is Matter of Wonder, and Complaint.

—*But when there was* **nothing remaining** *but to* **Attack**, *it was not thought fit to do it*, &c.—and a little after — *But however I have ſubmitted, tho' with a great deal of Regret*, &c. Here is ſomething remarkable in this, that they let the Duke's Hopes be led on to the Action it ſelf before they declar'd againſt it; as if they thought it not enough to oppoſe his Deſigns, unleſs they did it in a manner the moſt diſobliging in the World, and the moſt ſhocking. But however, his Grace thought fit to ſubmit, tho' with a *great deal of Regret*. I ſhall ſay little of this,

becauſe I wou'd not aggravate the Point againſt Allies, whoſe real Intereſt is ſo twiſted, and united with ours, as theirs is during the preſent Grandeur of *France*, and the Continuance of a War ſo neceſſary for the Safety of not only *Holland* and *England*, but of all *Europe:* The Danger of which from theſe *Dilatory* Methods I ſhall make ſufficiently evident from my Conſiderations on the D——s Letter to the St—s. I ſhall only add a Word or Two on his Grace's Poſtſcript, and ſo paſs on to the ſuppos'd Letter of Monſ. *D'Averquerque*, which the *Poſt-Man* has given us for Genuine, and the *Poſt-Boy* juſtly ſuſpects as Spurious.

P. S. *My Heart is ſo full, that I cannot forbear repreſenting on this Occaſion to Your High and Mightineſſes, that I have much leſs Authority here, than when I had the Honour to command your Troops laſt Year in* **Germany.**

It does, I confeſs, ſeem unaccountably ſtrange, that their H---h and M——ſſes ſhou'd laſt Year confide ſo much to his Grace's Conduct, as to venture their Forces under his Command, without ſuch a Check upon him, when if they miſcarry'd, they were not only Hundreds of Miles from their own Country, but, as ſome ſay, deſtitute of Neceſſaries to ſubſiſt them, if they had miſcarry'd; and this before his Grace had given ſuch a Proof of his *Conduct* and *Courage*, as he did in the Battles of *Schellemberg* and *Blenheim*; and yet when he had acquir'd all that Honour and Glory, by thoſe Memorable Defeats of the *French* and *Bavarians*, that they ſhou'd retrench his Power and Authority, and entirely ſubject all his Deſigns to the Determinations

of

of Three Gentlemen, who knew nothing of the Matter, is Reaſon enough for his Grace to make that moderate Remonſtrance of a *Slight*, which he had by no Means merited from their Hands.

To go on with the ſame *Poſt-Man*——— 'The 'Letter of the D———s to the St—s is not 'yet made Publick, but they have received the 'following Letter from Monſ. *D'Averquerque*, with 'ſome farther Particulars of the March of the Ar- 'my. And this without any Mark of its being ſpu- rious, tho' it contradicts in ſome meaſure the Let- ter of his Grace, as we ſhall ſee by peruſing it.

'The 18th the Army marched from *Braine* to '*Lion*, and *Fichermont*, towards the Enemy, whom 'we found encamp'd behind the *Little River Iſche*, 'as I had the Honour to acquaint you in my for- 'mer. Our Van came about Nine a Clock in the 'Morning in ſight of the Enemy, and our Army 'was drawn up in Order of Battalia. We had 'made a Detachment of Twenty Battalions, and 'Twenty Squadrons, to Attack the Right Wing of 'the Enemy in the Flank through the Woods of '*Soignies*, at the ſame Time, that we ſhou'd begin 'to Attacque them in the Front: But that De- 'tachment, commanded by General *Churchil*, was 'oblig'd to rejoin the Army in the Evening, ha- 'ving found it impoſſible to march that Way, be- 'cauſe of the Trees the Enemy had cut down to 'make the Roads impaſſable. Our Generals went 'twice the Day we came to view all the Poſts 'from one end to the other, whereby they might 'be Attack'd, and found them of ſo difficult Ac- 'ceſs, that they *unanimouſly* reported to me as their

‘ Sentiments that the Enterprizes was neither *ad-*
‘ *viſeable*, nor *practicable*, whereupon it was reſolv'd
‘ to retire, which we did Yeſterday in ſo good
‘ Order, that notwithſtanding the Enemy ſaw the
‘ ſame, they did not think fit to attack our Rear.
‘ We are going to Beſiege *Leuwe*, and demoliſh
‘ the Lines of the Enemy. I am, *&c.* From the Camp at *Wavre*, *Aug.* 20.

I ſhall not dwell much upon this, ſince it bears the Marks of Spuriouſneſs ſo viſibly, that it is not worth remarking, only the Duke of *Marlborough* is obliged to the *Poſt-Man* for placing it under his, as a *Contradictory Comment* of all his Grace had alledg'd. Firſt, he tells us of General *Churchil's* being detach'd with Twenty Batalions and Twenty Squadrons to the Wood of *Soignies*, which they found impaſſable by reaſon of Trees cut down, and which is an Inſtance not ſo much as given by the D———s in their Vindication, tho' very material, and contradicts what his Grace ſays of their viewing the Four Places they deſign to Attack; for had this Wood been firſt viewed, it muſt have been known to be impaſſable, without ſending a Detachment to make the Experiment; if it was view'd, it muſt have been known by himſelf and Monſ. *D'Averquerque*. But if it was neither of theſe Poſts, which my Lord Duke and he view'd, it ſeems odd that ſuch a Detachment ſhou'd be ſent to a Paſs unknown, and which prov'd unpaſſable, and not to One of thoſe Four Places, which were thought practicable by the Two Chief Generals. But it may be reply'd that this March of General *Churchil* was before they advanc'd into the Plain, according to

the

the *Journal* ſince publiſhed at the *Hague*, and Tranſlated into our *Courant*, *Monday*, *Sept.* 3. If ſo, it had nothing to do with the Reſolution; ſince, as this Letter ſays, they rejoin'd the Army in the Evening, I ſuppoſe of the 19th, though by the Letter we know not when: If ſo, then it is nothing to the Buſineſs in Hand, and cou'd not determine the Reſolution, as to the other *Four* Poſts which the Generals thought *Practicable.*

But if this is not ſufficient, what follows ſeems contrary to the Candour of Mr. *D' Auverquerque*, when he mentions the Generals viewing the Poſts from one end of the Line to the other, and not that he and my Lord Duke did the ſame; and that it was Unanimouſly declar'd, as the Opinions of all thoſe Generals, *That the Enterprize was neither* **Adviſeable** *nor* **Practicable**, and yet not add the Reaſons which induc'd him to be of my Lord Duke's Mind, that it was both *Adviſeable* and *Practicable*, nay, *an Opportunity too fair to be let ſlip.* Not to do this was Injuſtice to himſelf, and to the Duke, for certainly he cou'd not out of a ſlaviſh Compliance to his Grace's too great Forwardneſs to fighting Diſſemble his Opinion againſt it, and yet privately Inſinuate to the States, that he agreed in Opinion with the *Anti-Attackers.* This is a Procedure that no Body can lay to a Man of Mr. *D' Auverquerque*'s Honour and Bravery.

'But what precedes the Concluſion is extreamly 'Pleaſant, whereupon (ſays the Author of this 'Letter) it was reſolv'd to Retire, *Which we did* '*Yeſterday in ſo good Order, that notwithſtanding*

'*the*

'*the Enemy ſaw the ſame, they did not think fit to*
'*Attack our Rear.*

A Wonderful Event, and worthy Recording, that an Enemy who cou'd find no Security but in Unapproachable Faſtneſſes ſhou'd not quit that Security, to Attack an Enemy who deſir'd nothing more, or cou'd indeed in Reaſon, than ſuch a Wiſe Piece of Conduct, as for them to quit Voluntarily thoſe Entrenchments which we cou'd not overcome by our Force. That they that ſurpriz'd the *Wiſe D*——— ſo far by not oppoſing our Paſſage over the *Lane*, ſhou'd not venture in the open Field, with nothing but their own Courage to Defend them againſt the ſame Army, ſeems a thing ſcarce worthy the Notice of ſo great a Man as Mr. *D'Auverquerque*, and therefore I muſt conclude it none of his, becauſe inconſiſtant with his Character.

Theſe Reaſons I doubt not convinced the Author of the *Poſt-Boy* (who has a juſt Value for the Honour of both his Grace, and Mr. *D'Auverquerque*) to ſuſpect the Letter of not being *Genuine*, but a Suppoſititious Piece made out of ſome Accounts of the Affair, to ſpread in Oppoſition to the Influence, which his Grace's Letter might have on the People to the Prejudice of the D———s, to whoſe Letter we now come, that we may examine what they urge for their Conduct in a Point, which has ſo much the Appearance againſt them.

Poſtſcript to the *Flying-Poſt*, N. 1607. *London*, *Aug.* 22. 1705. *Hague. Aug.* 28. There is publiſh'd here the following Letter, ſaid to be from the

D———s

D——s of the S——s, that attended the Army, concerning the late Design of Attacking the *French* in their Camp in *Brabant*.

SIR,

'ACcording to what was projected *by us* and 'the Duke of *Marlborough*, we have made 'several Marches since the 15th Instant; on *Mon-* 'day last we marched from *Braine la Lieu*, as I had 'the Honour to signifie to Your High and Migh- 'tinesses to be our Design. We march'd along the 'Dyle, with an Intention to pass the *Lane*, and 'the *Ische*, and at the same Time to take *Louvain*, 'and to procure farther Advantages to the Army 'of the State, and their Allies, by fighting the 'Enemy in case an Occasion offer'd. But when 'we pass'd the *Lane*, we were surpriz'd to find 'that the Enemy did not dispute that Difficult 'Pass with us. At the other Post, that is to say 'the *Ische*, we found great Difficulty, all the Ene- 'mies Forces were Advantageously Posted; and 'besides that, by the Report of Three Generals, who 'had been to View them, there was no Ground 'fit for the Horse to March. We did not think 'fit to Attack the Passage, without first hearing 'the Opinion of Mr. *D'Auverquerque*, and the 'other Generals, and Lieutenant Generals, all 'whom we found, except Mr. *D'Auverquerque*, Una- 'nimously of Opinion, that it was an Affair of 'the last Consequence to Attack the Enemy in the 'said Post, and might be of great Danger to the 'S——s and the Common Cause. The Reasons 'they gave were, that the Enemy cou'd not be

'Attack'd

'attack'd without abundance of Danger, and Dis-
'advantage on our ſide, and that in caſe we
'ſhou'd receive any Diſaſter, we ſhou'd find our
'ſelves in very Troubleſome Circumſtances, Firſt,
'becauſe being ſo far advanc'd in the Enemies
'Country, we had neither Town nor Hiſpitals
'for our Wounded, ſo that in ſuch a Caſe the
'Enemy might eaſily cut off our Convoys of
'Proviſions. Beſides the above-mention'd Gene-
'rals were of Opinion, that the Affairs of the Al-
'lies and of our Republick, which ſome of them
'thought to be abſolutely in Hazard, were not
'yet in ſuch a Condition, as to undertake ſo deſ-
'perate an Enterprize, as they made this appear to
'be.

'My Lord Duke of *Marlborough*, as well as
'Mr. *D' Auverquerque*, were indeed of Opinion
'that the thing was Practicable, but we cou'd not
'think of giving our Conſent in an Affair of ſo
'great Importance againſt the Mind of the Ge-
'neral of the Army, whither Your High and Migh-
'tineſſes have done us the Honour to ſend us as
'your D———s.

'And as we believe that the Intention of Your
'High and Mightineſſes, contain'd in the Re-
'ſolution of the 5th Inſtant, that we might per-
'mit (without calling a Council of War) to make
'Two, or Three Marches to *Execute ſome Deſigns*
'*that were form'd by his Excellency, is now fulfill'd.*
'We ſhall for the Time to come behave our ſelves
'according to our Inſtructions from Your High
'and Mightineſſes of the 26th of *June* laſt, un-
'leſs Your High and Mightineſſes give us New

'Orders

'Orders thereupon. *We cannot conceal from Your 'High and Mightineſſes, that all the Generals of 'our Army thought it very ſtrange, that they ſhould 'know nothing in the leaſt of the aboveſaid Marches.* 'We came to Encamp here to Day, and we be- 'lieve we ſhall Decamp the ſame Day to Beſiege 'St. *Liewe*, as ſoon as the Neceſſary Ammunition 'is ready.

Sign'd

Rouwenoort, Van. Hemskirk, V. Schagen.

I ſhall not ſtand on ſuch a Trifle, as the placing themſelves before his Grace with *a by us and the Duke* ——— that is only Want of a *Fineneſs* of Manners, which that *Honeſt Nation* does not Affect; but I ſhall proceed to run over their Confus'd, Impoliſh'd Letter, and the weighty Reaſons it contains, and ſhall evidently ſhew, that, as they have been *extreamly*, nay, *unjuſtly* Partial in their Account, by hiding *all* the Reaſons of the *Fighting* ſide, ſo they have been extreamly Weak in Publiſhing Reaſons for their *Refuſal* to Fight, which betray a Puſilanimity, and Want of Senſe, in thoſe who propos'd them, or made the whole Deſign of theſe Marches, which they mention only Oſtentatious, and Vain, like the Expedition of *Comodus* or *Domitian* (I forget which) to the *Armorican* Shore againſt *Britain*, who picking up fine Shells, returned to *Rome* in Triumph over thoſe conquer'd Iſlanders. For they tell the S——s in the beginning of their Letter, that according to what

was projected by them, and the Duke of *Marlborough*, they had made *ſeveral Marches* ſince the 15th, with Intention to paſs the *Lane* and the *Iſche*, to take *Louvain*, and Fight the Enemy.

Theſe were Noble Projects, and Worthy theſe Marches; but what was done in purſuance of theſe Deſigns, form'd *ev'n by themſelves* and his Grace? Why the Old Proverb on the *French King* muſt paſs the *Iſche* to them. *The King of* France, *and Forty Thouſand Men, went up the Hill, and ſo came down again.* They paſs'd the *Lane*, but it was becauſe the Enemy, to their great Surprize, did not Oppoſe them, which wou'd have encourag'd any Men elſe to have Attacked them when they did Oppoſe them. They came in View of the *Iſche*, which they did not paſs, *becauſe the Enemy was on the other ſide*, and they cou'd not do it without Danger; whereas *Safe's the Word* with them, and their *D—h* No-fighting Generals, *ſome Wiſer than ſome*, and other Trite and Myſterious Proverbs, which Salve the Sore of a wounded Reputation. *Louvain* is not taken, and only *Lewe*, a poor ſmall Fortreſs of Four Hundred Men, of no Reſiſtance, is forc'd to Surrender to an Army of near 100000 Men.

Full of this Succeſs they draw to a Concluſion, with this Remark to their H—h and M——ſſes. ——— *And as we believe that the Intention of your High and Mightineſſes, contain'd in the Reſolution of the 5th Inſtant, that we might permit (without calling a Council of War) to make Two or Three Marches to Execute ſome Deſigns that were form'd by his Excellency, is now fulfill'd,* viz. by

Ex-

Executing nothing at all of the Designs form'd by his Excellency.

Every Rational Man wou'd conclude from the D———s omitting all that was urg'd by my Lord Duke and Mr. *D' Auverquerque*, why the Design of Attacking the Enemies in their Entrenchments was both *Practicable*, and an *Opportunity too fair to be let slip*, that the D——s are too Wise not to be very sensible that they are of such *Force* and *Energy*, that in the Judgment of all unbias's'd Men, and those of their own Nation too, they wou'd appear extreamly Preferrable to those of the contrary side. If they were not so ev'n in their Opinion, why were they not produc'd? My Lord Duke was not suspicious of their Efficacy, when he tells the S——s, that his Grace is *confident that the D——s of their High and Mightinesses wou'd acquaint them with the Reasons alledg'd to them on* **either side.** ——— But his Grace is here again disappointed in his Expectation of Justice from the D——s, for they have taken Care to pass all the Reasons the Duke and Mr. *D'Auverquerque* urg'd in Silence, while they have publish'd to the World the Reasons of the contrary Party without any thing to oppose them.

But since the D——s have not been so fair to their Generals nor ours, to Discover that their Designs for Battle, however over-rul'd, were not Rash, and Unworthy the High Posts they Injoy; at this Distance, I hope, we may be able to Prove, that those urg'd by the Party against *Fighting*, are not such Reasons as ought to have influenc'd the D———s to their Party.

Not therefore to dwell on Generals, let us examine the Particulars, as far as the *Generalneſs* of the Expreſſions, and the *Diſtance* from the Place, will permit.

To begin with the Firſt. —— *At the other Poſt— that is to ſay, the* Iſche, *we found great Difficulty, all the Enemies Forces were Advantageouſly Poſted, and beſides that, according to the Report of Three Generals, who had been te View them, there was no Ground for the Horſe to March.* That the Enemy were *Advantageouſly* Poſted we will eaſily admit, that their Deſign of avoiding Battle prompts them to; but the D———s ſhould have conſider'd whether or no they were ſo *very advantageouſly* Poſted, that the Situation and Fortification of their Camp, and all the Paſſes and Avenues to it, were ſufficient to put into the Ballance againſt the *Superiority* of Forces in *Goodneſs* and *Number*, which does not at all appear by this, or any other Reaſon they produce. What follows wou'd indeed be of Weight, if Matter of Fact, *viz. That there was no Ground for the Horſe to March.* I think firſt that the Generals ought to have been nam'd, and then it wou'd have appear'd whether their *Reputation* or *Judgment* wou'd outweigh that of the Duke and Monſ. *D'Auverquerque.* Next I can ſcarce believe that his Grace, and the other Brave General, that was of the contrary Opinion, cou'd be ſo very *Inconſiderate* and *Raſh* to hazard their Reputations on an Attack when there was no Ground for the Horſe to March to the Support of the *Foot*; and that Matter of Fact which is alledg'd by one Party, without producing the Reaſons

againſt

againſt it of the other, and which includes an Impoſſibility, may very rationally be ſuſpected of *Falſhood*. And I think no Man of Common Reputation, or Common *Senſe*, cou'd deſire an Attack on ſuch a Ground. My Lord Duke aſſures the St---s that both he and Monſ. *D'Averquerque* view'd the Four Places he deſign'd to Attack, and can any Man of *Common Senſe* then ſuppoſe how ſuch great Generals cou'd be guilty of ſuch a groſs Overſight.

But the D ——s proceed——*We did not think fit to attempt the Paſſage, without firſt hearing the Opinion of Monſ.* D'Auverquerque, *and the other Generals and Lieutenant-Generals; all whom we found, except Monſ.* D'Auverquerque, *unanimouſly of Opinion, that it was an Affair of the laſt Conſequence to Attack the Enemy in the ſaid Poſt, and might be of great Danger to the St—e, and the common Cauſe. The Reaſons they gave*, &c. Before we come to the Reaſons they gave, I have a Word or Two to ſay to this, which is, that it is apparent from hence, that only the *D——h* Generals were conſulted; and I add this only, becauſe I have found ſome urge, that all the *Engliſh* Generals, except my Lord Duke, were of the ſame Opinion with thoſe of the St---s; which if true, I cannot think are equal Ballance for Monſ. *D'Averquerque* and his Grace, unleſs they had given us equal Proofs of their *Skill* and *Conduct* with thoſe Gentlemen, who have had the Experience of ſo many *Campaigns*, and ſuch noble *Battles*, to recommend their *Authority*.

I ſpeak not this to reflect on any of our own Generals, who I am very well aſſur'd were for the Engagement, as being too Brave and too Knowing

to

to diſſent from his Grace, on an Occaſion where ſo much *Glory* was to gain'd to themſelves, and ſo much *Service* done for the *Publick*. That it was an Affair of the *laſt Conſequence* is moſt certain, and *Europe* will have Cauſe to feel the unhappy Conſequence of theſe *fearful* Meaſures, from whence the *falling* Power of *France* dates new Strength, and a Proſpect of a longer Duration; ſince nothing is plainer, than that no Body but *France* can gain by theſe *Impolitick Delays*. That it *might be of great Danger* is but a bare Suppoſition, that ought to be of no Weight, unleſs the Reaſons alledged by the *Non-fighting* Generals were ſufficient to ſhew that there was a *greater* Probability of the *Danger* than the *Victory*; that the Difficulties the Confederates were to ſtruggle with were not to be ſurmounted, by Reaſon that their Entrenchments and Paſſes made them in the *ſaid Poſt* Three Times ſtronger than they wou'd be out of it. But let us hear the Reaſons that were of ſuch Weight with the *Wiſe* D——s. Before which I muſt only premiſe one ſhort Remark, which is drawn from the very Words of this Eloquent Epiſtle, *viz. Three Generals went to view, and all the Generals and Lieutenant-Generals* gave their Opinion, I ſuppoſe upon the Report of the *Three*. If they all view'd the Poſts, it ought for the Satisfaction of the Publick to have been expreſs'd, if only the *Three* did, it ſeems ſomething odd that *all* the Generals and Lieutenant-Generals ſhou'd rather credit thoſe Three of *no Name*, than Monſ. *D'Auverquerque*, and his Grace, who had been likewiſe to view them, and were yet ſo blind as not to diſtinguiſh betwixt a thing

practi-

practicable, and that which was of the *laſt Conſequence and Danger* to the Troops firſt, which they commanded (in Name) and by their Deſtruction to the *St—s* and their *Allies*.

' The Reaſons they gave (ſay the D———s) ' were———that the Enemy cou'd not be Attack'd ' without Abundance of Danger and Diſadvantage ' on our Side; and that in Caſe we ſhou'd receive ' any Diſaſter, we ſhou'd find our ſelves in very ' troubleſome Circumſtances; firſt becauſe being ſo ' far advanc'd into the Enemies Country, we had ' neither Towns nor Hoſpitals for our wounded; ' ſo that in ſuch a Caſe the Enemy might very ea- ' ſily cut off our Convoys of Proviſion—beſides, ———before we come to the *Beſides*, (which yet contains nothing *new* or *different* from what is already urg'd) let us examine their Reaſons, for here is all that is urg'd by the Generals againſt the Attack, and all that prevail'd with the D———s to ſide with them in the Opinion.

The firſt is the *Danger* and *Diſadvantage*, with which we ſhou'd make the *Attack*———As this is worded, it is a difficult Matter to determine whether the *Danger* and *Diſadvantage* was *great* or *ſmall*, a Ballance for our *Superiority* in *Force* and *Number*, or not. That it is a *Danger* or *Diſadvantage* to Attack any Enemy entrenched is certain; it was ſo to break the Lines; and yet it is plain from the *Conduct* of the General, and the *Bravery* of the Troops, that this *Danger* and *Diſadvantage* ſignified nothing at; all we did our Buſineſs, and drove away the Enemy in ſpight of them, and that with very little Loſs. I might add, that all the Generals

rals of the *D——h* Army, and I ſuppoſe the D——s likewiſe, were againſt that Attempt, yet by the Duke's own Conduct and Reſolution, the *Danger* and *Diſadvantage* vaniſh'd, or were driven before us to our Enemies. Next there are no Particulars inſtanc'd to prove that this *Danger* and *Diſadvantage* was greater than the former, or that we had leſs Reaſon to hope the ſame Event from the *Conduct* of the *ſame General*, and the Bravery of the *ſame Soldiers*. And where there are no particular Obſtacles ſpecify'd and prov'd, it is but the bare Opinion of Men averſe to the Action, and will hold good againſt *all* Actions. For the Reaſons here urg'd will hold good againſt *any Fight* at all. Had we on our coming into the Plain found the Enemy drawn up in Battalia, and ready to receive us without the *little Rivulet of Iſche* before them, or the Eight Paſſes ſecur'd by them (as in another Account) the ſame Reaſons wou'd have oblig'd us to retire through the Defiles we had paſs'd, without *One* Blow for the Liberty of *Europe*; for firſt there muſt have been *Danger*, there is no fighting without it, and the Event of all Battles is certainly dubious; Experience gives us a Thouſand Examples of the moſt aſſur'd of Succeſs, that have been vanquiſh'd by the Forces they contemn'd; and the *Diſtance from their own Country, the Want of Towns and Hoſpitals, or any Diſaſter*, &c. wou'd have been fully as much againſt a Fair Battle, as againſt this Attack; nay, perhaps far more, if the Matter be rightly conſider'd. For had we found them in the open Field ready to receive us, we might very well conclude that they were in Heart, Strong and Numerous, and

not

not at all apprehenſive of our *Superiority of Force or Number*, and then it was an equal Lay; our *Danger* and *Diſadvantage* cou'd have been plain, when an Army after a March are to Encounter another Army freſh and equal. But on the other ſide, their retiring behind a *Rivulet* and Entrenchments ſhow'd them to be *fearful, conſcious of their Weakneſs*, and by Conſequence half conquer'd to our Hands.

Thus we ſee that the moſt *ſtrong* and *weighty* of the Generals Arguments would hold againſt fighting them at all, unleſs we cou'd have found them drunk, or aſleep, diſorder'd, few, or in ſhort, how never *French* Army has been found ſince this King's Reign. But if, in Reality, they were not to fight *at all*, why was the Duke banter'd with Marches to execute Deſigns form'd *by him* and the D——s, which were never to be executed? Why did they permit (without a Council of War) their Army to march ſo far into the Enemies Country, where it was impoſſible to put any of their Deſigns in Execution without being embaraſs'd with theſe, or greater Difficulties? Are the D——s in Earneſt with the St—s themſelves, when they tell them they march'd to procure farther Advantages (beſides taking *Louvain*, which they have not yet attempted) to the Arms of the St—s and their *Allies*, by *fighting* the Enemy in *Caſe an Occaſion offer'd*, when in Reality if theſe Reaſons are of any Force, *no ſuch Occaſion* cou'd ever offer it ſelf, ſince they cou'd never expect to fight (as is plain from what has been ſaid) without the *ſame Diſadvantages*—that is, if the *French* were weaker, they muſt find them Entrenched, if ſtronger, in the Field; in *both* which the Event muſt

be *dubious*, and more ſo in the open Field, than in the Entrenchments; for the Army with Attacks has Ten to One the Advantage: And there are *Ten* Examples of the Succeſs of thoſe, who Attack, to One of their Repulſe. But there is ſcarce One Example of a *dangerous* Rout of an Army, who have been able to Attack an Entrench'd Enemy, at leaſt of ſuch a Rout as cou'd produce thoſe *Inconveniencies*, the D———s wou'd perſwade us, they had Reaſon to apprehend.

This being ſo (as it moſt certainly is) the D——s ſhou'd have put into the Ballance of their Great General's Reaſons this Conſideration, whether a Repulſe (which is the moſt that cou'd have happen'd) wou'd have more endanger'd the St—e, or ſuch *Dilatory* Counſels, as muſt give the *French* Time to breath, and recover the Blow at *Hockſtet*? Nay, whether the meer *Apprehenſion* of a Repulſe, which in all Probability cou'd not have happen'd, was enough to outweigh that Conſideration. That this is the Aim of the *French*, is plain from their *Induſtrious* avoiding *all* Battles, if poſſible. They, by this Means, train their *Young*, *Raw* Soldiers up to the Field, to ſupply the Places of the *Veterans*, loſt in the foreſaid Battle, which in a Campaign or Two will be ſeaſon'd Soldiers, and have forgot the Panick Terror of that Day. No Man in his Wits can doubt but that the ſame Reaſon which makes them avoid a Battle ſhould make us puſh it, *viz.* that they ſhou'd never forget the Terror of our Arms, or make up the Loſs of thoſe *Veterans* we have cut off.

When

When *Hannibal* by a Train of Succeſs had broken all the *Veteran* Force of the *Roman* Empire, *Fabius Maximus* took this Method, the *French* now take, and *Hannibal*, like us, weighed to puſh that wary General, and force him to fight, which *Fabius* induſtriouſly avoided, till his Men, who had been ſo often broken, had gather'd Heart and Courage enough to reſcue almoſt loſt *Rome* out of the *Carthaginian* Power. Which made Old *Ennius* ſay of this *Maximus*,

Unus homo nobis cunctando reſtituit rem.

The *ſame* being the Occaſion, the *ſame* is the Policy of the preſent *French* Generals; and the *contrary* by Conſequence ought to be ours, in *forcing* them to fight, in ſpight of all their *Caution*. For, for us to *avoid* Battle is to do their Buſineſs to their Hands.

What has here been ſaid will, I think, anticipate an Anſwer to the *ſame* D———s *Beſides* — but let's hear it—*Beſides the abovemention'd Generals were* of **Opinion**, *that the Affairs of the high Allies, and of our Republick (which ſome of them thought to be abſolutely in Hazard) were not in ſuch a Condition, as to undertake ſo deſperate an Enterprize as this appear'd to be.* If theſe *Myſtical* D———s mean *that the Affairs of the Allies*, &c. *were not yet in ſo low a Condition* to attempt this *Deſperate* Enterprize, it is plain this Conduct muſt reduce them to a *lower*, when it may not be in their Power to execute any Deſign of this Nature, or indeed withſtand a *full-grown* Enemy, whom in their *Infancy* they durſt not Attack

with all the *Advantage* of Force and Number. If they mean that the foreſaid *Affairs are not yet in ſo good a Condition to attempt*, &c. this Conduct will certainly never *improve* their Condition, ſince what ſtrengthens the Enemy can never be ſuppos'd to meliorate our Affairs.

But after all, this is brought only as the *Opinion* of theſe Generals, not fortify'd with any Reaſons, and therefore ought to be of *no* Force with them; or if the Generals proved their Aſſertion by *undeniable* Reaſons, the D——s have injur'd them in concealing them, as to this Point, as well as to the Proof of its being a *deſperate Enterprize*, or that the *whole Republick was at Hazard*. But what will theſe Generals ſay when in another Campaign the *French* being recover'd, and ſupply'd with Numbers equal to their great Deſigns, ſhall come in Queſt of the D——s, and *fight* them, nay, *rout* their Army? Is not the St—e in a much greater Hazard? Will it not be much *more* difficult for them to recruit their beaten Army when purſu'd by a *Victorious* and *Diligent* Enemy, than on a *bare Repulſe* in *Poſſe*, when the Enemy are not in a Capacity of making ſuch a uſe of it, as ſhall prevent the St—s from healing the Wound, and making up the Loſs? In the *firſt* Caſe there muſt be nothing but *Ruin*, in the laſt *Ruin* cannot come, but *Succeſs*, *Victory* and *Security*, might in all Probability have been the Event; unleſs we can ſuppoſe that both the Duke and Monſ. *D'Auverquerque*, cou'd be more ignorant than the freſheſt Captain in their Armies; for no Man that had ſeen Two Campaigns cou'd be ſo groſly miſtaken, as to believe and give Reaſons too (for ſo they did, tho' the D——s have been ſo

un-

unfair to omit them) for the *Feazibility* of an Enterprize, which was so *desperate*, and which must have hazarded both the *Allies* and the *S——s*. These are Positions, as Absurd, as Impossible, and cou'd have been urg'd by none but such as deal in *Louis-d'-Ors*, as well as *S—p* and *C——se*.

But let us suppose, to make it plainer, that we had lost 10000 Men in the Attack; we may well allow an equal Number of Men on the Enemies side, and then we were on as good a Foot as before the Engagement, and the Enemy in a worse, having lost more of their *Veterans*, who must have bore the Brunt of the Repulse. But if they had not lost above half the Number, we had been an equal, if not superior, Match for them if they left their Entrenchments to pursue us, and they must have paid for their Boldness. So that all the Talk of being so far in the *Enemies Country*, and Want of *Hospitals*, &c. is nothing but *plain Banter*, tho' the best of their Reasons, and the only Specious Pretext, they had to gloss over a *Treachery*, not to be parallell'd. But let us hear them once more, for they are *Admirable Orators* as well as *Statesmen*. ——— *My Lord Duke of* **Marlborough**, *as well as Monsr. D'***Auverquerque** *were indeed of Opinion, that the thing was Practicable*; but I must suspend your **But** a Moment, and ask you, Gentlemen, whether my Lord Duke, and Monsr. *D'Auverquerque*, gave you no Reasons for their *Opinion*? Did they only barely tell you, that it was their *Opinion*? Did they allow what the other Generals urg'd as Reasons for Good, and yet say their *Opinion*

was

was contrary? Cou'd the *Reaſons* your Generals produc'd have the Force to convince you of their Validity, who knew nothing of the Matter, and yet make no Impreſſion on his Grace, and Monſ. *D'Auverquerque*? Cou'd thoſe Two Gentlemen, Remarkable for their good Senſe, and Experience in Martial Affairs, ſit by and hear your *Reaſons* enforc'd, and reply, *Truly 'tis a deſperate Undertaking, in which both the Allies and S——s are hazarded, yet 'tis our* **Opinion** *it ought to be, tho' we can give you no Reaſons for that Opinion, or confute thoſe Reaſons you have brought?* This is Impoſſible. Where therefore are the Reaſons they urg'd? Why do you not vindicate your ſelves ſo much, as to let the World ſee that you took the ſtronger ſide; that you were induc'd to what you did by Arguments the contrary Party cou'd not Anſwer? This had been fair to your ſelves, as well as thoſe Two Generals, who diſſented from you in the Point. But let ſome Men think you Fools, they are miſtaken; you are not ſuch *N——ys* to ſhew the *Force* of your Adverſaries Arguments, leſt that ſhould diſcover the *Weakneſs* of your own. — Since therefore we cannot hope for *Candour* or *Honeſty* from you, let us proceed to your — *But we cou'd not think of giving our Conſent in an Affair of ſo great Importance, againſt the Mind of all the Generals of the Army, whither your High and Mightineſſes have done us the Honour to ſend us as your D———s.* Not againſt the Mind of *all* the Generals, for there was One *Fighting* General, tho' a *D—k-m—n.*—— But ſuppoſe you had, if the Reaſons of the *One* General for *Fighting* had

had been better than thoſe of the *Many* againſt it, where had your Prudence been queſtion'd? Cou'd you not remember, that all the *ſame* Generals were againſt breaking the Lines, as a *Difficulty Unſurmountable?* Was there not one in Particular ſo averſe to it, that he only begg'd to defer it till *the Morning*, and was in his *Impertinent Importunity* commanded to his Poſt, and his Duty? Does not this ſtick in his Stomach? Does it not continue his Mind againſt *Fighting* in pure Pique, that his Advice was not taken before, and that the contrary appear'd not only ſo *Fortunate*, but ſo well Concerted? And had not your *Great Wiſdoms* Reaſon on the one ſide to think your Generals as much miſtaken now, as they were before? Might they not be influenc'd by *Diſguſt*, *want of Experience*, by *Envy* or *Revenge*, &c? And the latter end of this very Letter of the *Sage D——s* gives ſufficient Ground for us to imagine that they are ſo. ——*We cannot conceal* (ſay they) *from* **your High and Mightineſſes that** all **the Generals of our Army thought it very ſtrange, that they ſhou'd know nothing in the leaſt of the abovesaid Marches.** *Hinc illæ Lachrymæ!* Hence all the Grievance! This is the Source of their *Opinion againſt Fighting*. This provok'd them to a Reſolution of diſappointing the Deſign of thoſe Marches, about which they were not *in the leaſt* conſulted; at leaſt we muſt conclude ſo till they Publiſh better Reaſons than they have yet for their Opinion: And firſt ſhew, and then confute thoſe of my Lord Duke and Monſ. *D'Auverquerque* for the contrary. His Grace

and

and Monſ. *D'Auverquerque* had *more* Reputation to loſe, than any of thoſe Generals *without Name*, or *without Reaſon*, never ſignaliz'd by any Action, or diſtinguiſh'd by any Merit. Nor had his Grace a leſs Noble, leſs Numerous, or leſs Brave Army to loſe, than the *S——s*; *England* confided her Army to his Conduct, without any *D——s* to Direct or Controul him, and all that the *S——s* have got by their D———s is to loſe the *only* Opportunity of turning the Ballance of *Europe*, ſecuring the Duke of *Savoy*, placing *Charles* III. on the *Spaniſh* Throne, ſecuring the Empire, enlarging their own Bounds, and by Conſequence fortifying their *S——e* by ſafer and more numerous Frontiers on the ſide of a *dangerous* Neighbour, they in all Probability are like to have this War, unleſs another *Blenheim* be ſent by *Providence* to Retrieve that Good Luck, which nothing but *D———s* cou'd have loſt.

Thus much I have thought fit to ſay on the Preſent Subject, believing this enough to raiſe all true *Engliſhmen*, and even the *Dutch* Patriots too, to endeavour to free our Councils from the Clog of *D——s*, which can never be of any Advantage to the *S——s* or *Confederacy*, but may often, as now, deprive us of thoſe Succeſſes Providence offers to our Arms. The Meaſures of Providence are always adapted to the *Freedom* of our Natures; if we are Obſtinate to our own Ruin; it is in vain for Providence to offer us Advantages, which we always blindly refuſe.

It is I think very plain from what I have ſaid, that as the Republicks of Old never thought of any

any ſuch Creature as a *D——y*, who knows nothing of the Matter, to Direct or Controul the Generals who do; ſo no Modern *S—r*, but the Modern *Dutch*, ever entertain'd ſo mad a Piece of Politicks, which all *Europe* is like to ſuffer for. I had ſome Thoughts of adding ſome Conſiderations on the Journal of *theſe Marches*, as Printed at the *Hague* in *Dutch*, and here in *Engliſh*, in the *Daily Courant* of the Third of *September*; but on Peruſal of it I can find nothing in the World in it to juſtifie the *D——s*, but the Repulſe of 300 Men from the Village of *Hoelberg*, who were not ſupported in their Brave Aſſault; but how far that will do it I leave to every unbiaſs'd Reader. It is my Opinion that this Journal, inſtead of leſſening the Authority of his Grace the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Letter, confirms that this broke up without any Reaſon at all.

Though I have been ſo ſhort in this Eſſay, if any Man ſhall venture to Oppoſe what I advanc'd, I ſhall ſhew him that it was not for Want of Matter that I gave them no more at this Time, but becauſe I thought I had ſaid enough to convince any Rational Man of what I propos'd.

Some Remarke on a Letter from Altea, *inſerted in the* Poſt-Man *of* Saturday, Sept. 1.

BEfore I proceed to this Letter, I muſt ſatisfie the Reader that I have no Quarrel with the Author of the *Poſt-Man*, as being a Stranger to him, nor have I any Intereſt to find Fault with his Paper; nay, I wou'd fain think from the Gentleman's Character that there was no Ill in his Intention, but that only a *Pride of Intelligence* betray'd him to print ſo Scandalous a Libel on the Government. Having premis'd this, I hope I may proceed to make good my Charge, as likewiſe to ſhow the ill Conſequence of publiſhing any thing that may in the leaſt reflect on our Miniſtry, as Men of no certain, but fluctuating Counſels, *&c.* when the Enemies of the Government have ſo openly aſſaulted them in their *Memorials*, and other Papers of the ſame Kidney. But firſt let us ſee the Letter it ſelf.

From on Board the Britannia *in* Altea Bay, Aug. 3. *O. S.*

'ACcording to your Deſire I will give you ſome Account of our preſent Expedition; tho' you might eaſily have thought of Somebody more capable to ſatisfie your Curioſity upon ſo important a Subject; but I'm ſure you cou'd have found none more ready to oblige you than my ſelf. I am perſwaded that you cannot be ignorant of the Diſpoſition of our Allies the *Portugueze*, and of the Succeſs of their laſt Campaign, and therefore I will not trouble you with any Account thereof, nor vex you with a particular Relation of thoſe Diſappointments and Troubles the Earl of *Peterborough* has met with at *Lisbon*; only give me Leave to tell you, that with my Lord's Rhetorick and Diligence he has not been able to engage People into the Meaſures he propos'd to favour the Deſigns the Fleet might go upon. Conſidering the little Service Her Majeſties Troops may do in *Portugal*, the Year being ſo far ſpent, his Lordſhip turn'd all Efforts upon my Lord *Galway*, and gave himſelf no Reſt until he had obtain'd from him Two Regiments of Dragoons: I will not pretend to make you ſenſible of the great Trouble and Pains we had (which might have been done in another Country without any) to provide Forage, and other Neceſſaries for their Embarkation. Beſides

those

'thoſe Troops we were to take at *Gibraltar*, as we have ſince done, the Bat-
'talions of the Guards, and Three Old Regiments, leaving Two New-rais'd
'ones inſtead of them. Having thus got together 19 Battalions of good
'Infantry, and about 1300 Horſe, with a good Train of Artillery, and the
'King of *Spain* on Board the Fleet, *His Lordſhip deſign'd to have gone directly*
'*for* Italy *(as we now perceive by thoſe Officers who are come to us from the*
'*Duke of* Savoy) *where with the Forces that were to join them from the ſaid Duke,*
'*or Prince* Eugene, *he might have been in a State to have driven the* French *out of*
'Italy, *and put the Duke of* Savoy *at Liberty to have employ'd his Forces another*
'*Way*. How ſeaſonable an Attempt wou'd have been at *Naples* I leave
'you to judge: But to be ſhort (for it regrets me to think of the Miſcar-
'riage of ſo great a Project) his Lordſhip was ready to leave *Lisbon* with
'theſe Reſolutions, when Letters arrived from *Turin* and *Genoa*, adviſing not
'only of the good Diſpoſition of the *Catalonians* in Favour of *Charles* III.
'but that 4000 of them had actually taken Arms, and were retired to the
'Mountains, impatiently expecting our Arrival on the Coaſt; which broke
'his Lordſhip's former Meaſures, and oblig'd him, contrary to his Inclina-
'tions, to frame new Deſigns on *Catalonia*, according to new Orders.
'My Lord was never very fond of any Attempts on that Province, becauſe
'it is ſo very *diſtant*, and affords no Harbour for our Fleet, and conſequent-
'ly can never be ſuccour'd without vaſt Charges, and with no leſs Difficul-
'ty. On the contrary, it is ſo near a Neighbour to *France*, that the Enemy
'has all the Advantage imaginable. However, I muſt tell you that all Ad-
'vices from thoſe Parts abundantly aſſure us of the Diſpoſition of the Inha-
'bitants for a Revolt. The Crouds of People that daily came off to us from
'this Coaſt to declare their Zeal for their Lawful Prince, are no ſmall Per-
'ſwaſives to expect ſomething conſiderable from a Province where we have
'always had our Emiſſaries. I can aſſure you that every one here is fluſhed
'with the Hopes of Succeſs, and nothing I am ſure can contribute more to
'it, than the Unanimity, Concord, and good Underſtanding, which is a-
'mong us. Every Man ſeems to reſolve to do ſomething that is great and
'noble. The King is in very good Health, and wonderfully pleas'd with
'my Lord's great Zeal for the Publick. But as it often happens, where
'Men are touch'd with an Ambition to ſerve their Country, and the Pub-
'lick Cauſe, the Means, by which they are to act, prove deficient. *Thus my*
'*Lord* Peterborough *wou'd think of nothing leſs than paſſing forward to* Madrid
'*before the Enemy can be in a State of making any Head againſt him, if his Lord-*
'*ſhip did not want what is moſt neceſſary*; 200000 l. *were ſufficient to enable us to*
'*go through with ſo great a Deſign, which now I am afraid muſt drop for want*
'*of Money to defray the extraordinary Charges. Tho' this Project ſeems a little*
'*ſurprizing, and too great, yet all the Officers are of Opinion, that it is very feaſible.*
'*The Country of* Catalonia *is known to be not only the moſt populous Province of*
'Spain, *but alſo that which abounds moſt in Men diſciplin'd in the Art of War.*
'*Neither does it want for Horſes, inſomuch that for a good Sum of Money we*
'*might raiſe a ſufficient Number of Regular Troops to carry on and maintain ſuch*

'*a*

'*a Deſign.* I hope our next Expreſs will bring you the News of our Suc-
'ceſs, which God grant. We arrived in this Bay the 30th paſt; the whole
'Fleet is very near water'd, and we only expect a fair Wind to remove.

I have been oblig'd to tranſcribe the whole, becauſe the Author ſhou'd not complain of Injuſtice. He tells us in the beginning that his Correſpondent might eaſily have thought of one more capable of ſatisfying his Curioſity,---and if he means with Matter of Fact, I dare believe he ſays true, for the greateſt Part of this Letter ſeems to be the blind Conjectures of ſome *Under-ſpeculative Politician*, who has drawn his Knowledge, or at leaſt his *Imagination*, from the Surmiſes of the Inferiour Officers, and reports thoſe for the Reſolution of the General, and the Government. I confeſs, after his way, he ſeems to pay a great deal of Deference to his Lord's Deſigns, Conduct and Induſtry, and I ſhall agree with him, that my Lord is a Man of as much Spirit, and as Active and Induſtrious to bring thoſe things about which were committed to his Conduct, as any Man living. But, on the other ſide, he does it ſo inartificially that he makes the Reputation of Her Majeſty and Her Miniſtry very great Sufferers by his Complements to his Lordſhip, which I am ſure can never be agreeable to his Lordſhip, who has ſo True and Juſt a Value for them. The Streſs of this Letter ſeems to be directed to repreſent to the People, that the Miniſtry are fluctuating in their Counſels, and that upon Projects, very weakly grounded, they put the Nation to ſo vaſt an Expence of Men and Money, and venture them on ſo long and hazardous a Voyage, either without ſufficient Reaſons to juſtifie their Conduct, or by a Levity of Will change thoſe well-concerted Meaſures for new, and thoſe more uncertain and leſs beneficial to the Publick Cauſe. And that when theſe leſs prudent Meaſures had ſucceeded thoſe more rational, that for want of a Supply to 200000 *l.* they crampt the Buſineſs, and hindred the Progreſs of our Arms of *Madrid* it ſelf, before the Enemy cou'd be in a Condition to oppoſe us.

This is the Sum of the Matter, as is plain from his own Words; firſt he tells us, *That having taken the King of* Spain *on Board, that his Lordſhip deſign'd to have gone directly for* Italy (as we, *&c.*) This methinks is founded on a very weak Bottom, and ſo weak that I wonder the Author of the *Poſt-Man* ſhou'd commit it to the Publick View on ſo Important a Subject. If we ask how did this Gentleman know that his Lordſhip deſign'd to go directly for *Italy*? Did his Lordſhip ſhew him his Commiſſion? Was he of the Council of War, or Secretary to the Expedition? If either of theſe he betrays a Truſt repos'd in him, by publiſhing a Secret ſo Neceſſary to be kept Private; for if his Letters had fall'n into the Enemies Hands it had given them Warning of our Deſigns. But indeed he only builds this Fundamental Poſition on the Diſcourſe of certain Officers that came from the Duke of *Savoy*, *as we now* perceive *by the Diſcourſe of thoſe Officers that are come to us from the Duke of* Savoy. From this Diſcourſe of thoſe *Savoyards* I ſuppoſe he gather'd the Partition of our Forces, and thoſe of the Duke of *Savoy*, ours in Conjunction

junction with ſome from either Prince *Eugene*, or the Duke of *Savoy*, he knows not which, were to Act in *Naples*, in order to drive the *French* out of *Savoy* and *Milan*, and by this Means the Duke of *Savoy* had been at Liberty to have *Employ'd his Forces another Way*, that is, I ſuppoſe, in *Catalonia*, or to Aſſiſt the Emperor in *Hungary*, or elſe among the *Cevennois*, or any where elſe where they ſhou'd not be, with any Proſpect of Service and Succeſs, if he were but at Liberty to *Employ them another Way*. The Gentleman's Modeſty is very Remarkable, for he leaves the Author of the *Poſt-Man* to judge how *Seaſonable an Attempt on* Naples *wou'd have been :* But he had been more Modeſt to have left that Matter to the Judgment of the Queen and Miniſtry, and to his Lordſhip, and *Charles* III. *&c.* who were a little better acquainted with the Matter, than this Gentleman ſeems to be. There is, no doubt, but an Attempt on *Naples* wou'd be very Seaſonable, whenever we have Men or Money to ſpare, (though a nearer Way wou'd be from the Emperor's Territories on the *Adriatick*) but the Query is, whether it was not more Seaſonable to fall into *Catalonia*, a Place ſo fertile of Men *Diſciplin'd in the Art of War, and Horſes*, from whence we *cou'd paſs to* Madrid *before the Enemy cou'd be in a Condition to Oppoſe us*. *Catalonia* is not ſo far from us as *Naples*, and *Porto Mahone* (which in Probability will not be hard to take) will be as good a Harbour as *Naples* affords. He tells us (if we cou'd believe him) *That his Lordſhip was never fond of making any Attempts on that Coaſt*, for ſome Reaſons which this Gentleman urges, and are not worth the repeating, for they are *Fore-caſtle Politicks*, which he goes on, and therefore I muſt tell him that the Expedition was always determin'd to the Place it went to ; that our Emiſſaries, (which he confeſſes were Conſtant in that Country) gave too Faithful an Account to their Principals of Affairs there for us not to Build Sufficiently upon the Information ; that there was greater Probability of Succeſs when another Part of the ſame Contriguous Country was Attack'd, than if we had given the Blow as far as *Naples*, and left all the *Spaniſh* and *French* Forces united againſt the *Portugueze*, whoſe Warlike Exploits we have no Reaſon to have any great Expectations from, as appears by this very Letter. That to ſuffer the Duke of *Anjou* to fix and confirm himſelf in the Capital, or Chief Kingdom of the Monarchy, had been no great Inducement to its Dependants to come in to our ſide. That it wou'd look like a Flight for *Charles* III. to leave *Spain*, which muſt have diſhearten'd, if not extinguiſh'd his Party there ; whereas his going from *Portugal* to a *Spaniſh* Country, and thoſe People joining him, it gives them new Heart, and has already had that Effect, that it has caus'd another Riſing in *Valentia*. And laſtly, there was no Need of ſo Expenſive and Tedious a Voyage for us and the *Dutch* to go *Naples*, when from *Dalmatia* the Emperor might, under the Protection of a ſmall Squadron of our Men of War, pour what Forces he pleaſes into *Naples* and *Sicily*.

After

After what is ſaid, I dare think no Man will ever believe the Calumny that any Lord was always Averſe to going to *Catalonia*, whither he was always deſign'd, and ſo fond of going to *Italy*, whither he had no Commiſſion from her Majeſty.

Well, but now he is for *Catalonia*, he finds it is ſo Fruitful of Men, and Horſes for War, that if the Government wou'd give him Credit for 200000 *l.* he wou'd get to *Madrid* before the Enemy was in Condition to Oppoſe him. This is almoſt as mad a Project as going to *Naples*. Muſt *Catalonia* be left open, without Forces, to the near Invaſion of the Neighbouring *French*, who are not ſo many Days March from thence as *Catalonia* is from *Madrid*? Are the Duke of *Berwick* and the Count *de Tholouſe* of no more Account to the *Catalonians*, when they have parted with their Security, the Army, as far as *Madrid*? Or cou'd our 14000 Men have guarded *Catalonia*, and yet march'd to *Madrid* too?

But this is too Childiſh and Trifling; and it was only urg'd to make the People believe that if the Expedition miſcarry'd, or had not that noble Effect which was expected, it was the Miniſtries Fault in not ſending this 200000 *l.* Theſe are not Things worth ſpeaking of, nor ſhou'd I have minded ſuch a Letter in any Paper of leſs Reputation, but coming in the *Poſt-Man*, it is look'd on by too many as authentick, and ſo may, for want of Conſideration, fix an Imputation on the Miniſtry, which they cannot deſerve, but cannot hold if People will but conſider the Reaſon of the Thing. I will only add, that I hope the Author of the *Poſt-Man* will be a little more cautious of what ſilly Letters he inſerts for the future. I am ſure it will be more for the Reputation of his Paper with Men of Senſe and Probity, and leſs prejudicial to the Publick. For of all Men living he ought to be the moſt cautious of publiſhing falſe News, to the Prejudice of that Government and Miniſtry to which he is oblig'd for ſo conſiderable an Income as his Paper brings him.

F I N I S.